Videos you watch may be … Prime. 2003. “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology,” Axtell (2000). This landmark volume provides a pluralistic and comprehensive picture of the field of virtue epistemology. If Sosa’s criticisms of traditional coherentist and foundationalist views together with his own positive proposal are plausible, virtue reliabilism apparently has the resources to deal effectively with one of the more challenging and longstanding problems in contemporary epistemology. Indeed, taken as an account of epistemic justification in any of the usual senses, Montmarquet’s view is obviously problematic, since it is possible to be justified in any of these senses without satisfying Montmarquet’s conditions, that is, without exercising any virtuous intellectual character traits. If Greco’s account of knowledge is correct, this mischaracterizes the conditions for knowledge. The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology answers all of these questions. Virtue epistemologists can be divided into two groups. One of these is the reply it offers to the skeptic. (This again is due to the fact that knowledge and justification are sometimes acquired in a more or less passive way.) 1995. Some virtue responsibilists (e.g., Zagzebski 1996) have argued that the character traits of interest to them are the intellectual counterpart to what Aristotle and other moral philosophers have regarded as the moral virtues and that these traits are therefore properly regarded as intellectual virtues. Second, Greco’s definition of knowledge requires that one’s belief be objectively justified. These character-based versions of virtue epistemology are referred to as instances of “virtue responsibilism,” since the traits they regard as intellectual virtues might also be viewed as the traits of a responsible knower or inquirer. Recognizing that any given quality is likely to be helpful for reaching the truth only with respect to a limited field of propositions and only when operating in a certain environment and under certain conditions, Sosa also offers the following more refined characterization: “One has an intellectual virtue or faculty relative to an environment E if and only if one has an inner nature I in virtue of which one would mostly attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field of propositions F, when in certain conditions C” (284). This explains why Zagzebski characterizes knowledge simply as belief – rather than true belief – arising from acts of intellectual virtue. The foundationalist holds that the justification of nonbasic beliefs derives from that of basic or foundational beliefs and that the latter are justified on the basis of things like sensory experience, memory, and rational insight. All Hello, Sign in. Because of their close resemblance to standard reliabilist epistemologies, these views are referred to as instances of “virtue reliabilism.”. Her view focuses alternatively on cognitive character in its own right, the role of choice in intellectual flourishing, the relation between moral and epistemic normativity, and the social and communal dimensions of the intellectual life. According to Greco, one is subjectively justified in believing a given proposition just in case this belief is produced by dispositions that one manifests when one is motivated to believe what it is true. 2002. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge, and Understanding. The traits of interest to virtue responsibilists are also a means to these values, since a person who is, say, reflective, fair-minded, perseverant, intellectually careful, and thorough ordinarily is more likely than one who lacks these qualities to believe what is true, to achieve an understanding of complex phenomena, etc. But traditionally, the coherentist/foundationalist debate has been an in-house debate among internalists. The skeptic assumes that to know a given claim, one must be in possession of grounds or reasons which, via some inductive, deductive, or other logical or quasi-logical principle, provide one with a cogent reason for thinking that the claim is true or likely to be true. Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief.1 In 1991 he wrote the book Knowledge in Perspective and in 2007 he wrote A Virtue Epistemology. In other words, one’s being objectively justified must be a necessary and salient part of the explanation for why one believes the truth. Montmarquet goes on to argue that the traits we presently regard as intellectual virtues merit this status because they are qualities that a truth-desiring person would want to have (30). Montmarquet argues that the status of these traits as virtues cannot adequately be explained on account of their actual reliability or truth-conduciveness. 1994. My belief about the time, for instance, fails to satisfy her conditions for knowledge because what explains my reaching the truth is not any virtuous motive or activity on my part, but rather a stroke of good luck. For many years, Rutgers philosophers have set the agenda in epistemology, from Alvin Goldman's work on reliability, to Ernest Sosa's work on virtue epistemology, to Peter Klein's work on scepticism. In developing their views, they go on to focus more or less exclusively on cognitive faculties or powers like introspection, vision, reason, and the like. Unknown to me, however, the clock unexpectedly stopped exactly 12 hours prior, at 12:05 AM. “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,”, Greco, John. A Virtue Epistemology presents a new approach to some of the oldest and most gripping problems of philosophy, those of knowledge and skepticism. Moreover, these qualities are “personal excellences” in the sense that one is also a better person (albeit in a distinctively intellectual rather than straightforwardly moral way) as a result of possessing them, that is, as a result of being reflective, fair-minded, intellectually courageous, tenacious, and so forth. “Virtue Epistemology,”, Zagzebski, Linda. He therefore supplements his account with three additional kinds of virtues that regulate this desire. It remains, however, that one is likely to find these views plausible only to the extent that one is already convinced of a certain, not wholly uncontroversial position that undergirds and partly motivates them.
2020 ernest sosa virtue epistemology